Wa ʿalaykum al-salām wa raḥmatullāh wa barakātuh!
Mawlānā Muḥammad Zakwān Nadwī has invited me to express an opinion on weighty scholarly themes: the standing of ijtihād, the methodological approach of Mawlānā Ḥamīd al-Dīn Farāhī, the phonetic resemblance between the words shukr and shirk, and the application of the concept of shirk to certain modern human activities. In discussing these questions one must be mindful of the revealed texts, the uṣūl al-fiqh, the Arabic lexicon and the demands of rigorous academic enquiry. I set out below my observations in reply.
1. Mawlānā Ḥamīd al-Dīn Farāhī’s view on ijtihād and his scholarly method
To my knowledge Mawlānā Farāhī has left no independent treatise devoted exclusively to ijtihād; hence to ascribe to him a detailed doctrine, in the absence of explicit written proof, would contravene academic caution. Yet his scholarly method, research temperament and work across many disciplines make it plain that he never counted himself among those who saw the gate of ijtihād as closed. His scholarly life shows that he deemed reflection, investigation and evidence-based reasoning indispensable elements of learning, and he himself practised ijtihād.
His ijtihādī insight was not limited to legal problems: his tafsīr of the Qurʾān, discovery of its naẓm, researches in Arabic language and literature, and critical review of prevailing views in the Islamic sciences attest that he refused to content himself with mere adherence to inherited statements; rather, he accorded primary weight to sound evidence, investigation and direct reflection.
Our teacher Mawlānā Shahbāz Iṣlāḥī used to remark that Mawlānā Farāhī was a mujtahid not only in fiqh but even in ṣarf and naḥw. This observation makes clear both his scholarly rank and the wide scope of his ijtihādī method. He did not see ijtihād as restricted to formulating new views on a few legal details; he followed the research principle that every issue must be examined in the light of its primary sources, prevailing opinions must be reviewed, and where evidence demands a fresh or different view it should be stated openly.
A distinction, however, must be observed. Not every scholarly disagreement merits the title of ijtihād. Yet when a scholar, well-versed in the principles and sources of his subject, critically examines inherited views on the basis of evidence and departs from them, the ijtihādī element becomes manifest. That quality is present in Mawlānā Farāhī’s work to the highest degree. Thus, even though no separate writing of his on ijtihād has reached us, his method and practice show that he acknowledged its legitimacy and exercised it. A study of his legacy is more reliable than attributing to him a detailed unverified theory.
2. The legal status of ijtihād and whether its door remains open
I hold the view that the door of ijtihād remains open. Whatever the Sharīʿa has allowed, and whatever is indispensable for the continuity of divine guidance, can never be forbidden permanently by any human being. Ijtihād is not the quest to escape the Sharīʿa; rather, it is the endeavour, in the light of its proofs, to understand its rulings and apply them to new circumstances.
The Qurʾān and the Sunna do not specify in detail, for every age, every particular ruling. Many issues arise from changing conditions, new scientific discoveries, social transformations and the growing complexity of human life. Their resolution demands reflection upon the revealed texts, the uṣūl al-fiqh, the aḥkām, the maṣāliḥ and maqāṣid of the Sharīʿa, together with relevant facts; this qualified activity is ijtihād.
Were the gate of ijtihād shut, the reliable avenue to Sharīʿa guidance on new problems would be blocked, and people would either force earlier specific rulings onto every circumstance, regardless of context, or act without religious guidance—both fraught with difficulty. Ijtihād guards against such outcomes, provided it remains within sound principles and Sharīʿa bounds.
Moreover, who holds authority to close the gate? Any scholar who examines evidence and derives a ruling is, in practice, engaged in ijtihād. Thus, to affirm its legitimacy yet close its door is contradictory. Likewise, to elevate a muqallid’s or earlier scholar’s statement to the point that no later investigator may, on the basis of proof, reconsider it, is unsound. Respect is due, benefit may be taken, and following may be proper in cases, but no human opinion may rival the Qurʾān and the Sunna as proof. The real ḥujja is Allah’s Book, the Sunna of His Messenger ﷺ, and the valid evidences derived therefrom.
That the gate is open does not mean all are equally entitled to voice opinions on all matters. Ijtihād requires familiarity with the Qurʾān and Sunna, mastery of Arabic, knowledge of inference principles, acquaintance with the scholarly heritage, grasp of the factual reality and intellectual integrity. Where specialisation is essential, the expertise of specialists must be sought. Especially with modern scientific, medical, economic and environmental issues, reliable Sharīʿa research must be paired with sound empirical study.
Ijtihād permits disagreement, but not all opinions are equally sound. Weight is determined by quality of proof, methodological soundness and consonance with facts. Freedom in ijtihād is freedom to think under the discipline of evidence, not freedom for intellectual licence.
In summary, ijtihād is neither deviation from the Sharīʿa nor a relic of history; it is an indispensable means for applying Sharīʿa proofs to emerging questions and sustaining divine guidance. Instead of closing its door, we must clarify its conditions, limits and responsibilities.
3. Linguistic resemblance between shukr and shirk and their semantic relation
The words shukr and shirk share phonetic likeness: both contain shīn and rāʾ, differing only in the third letter. Does this resemblance go beyond form to meaning? The answer demands consultation of the lexicons, derivations and usages of Arabic. A mere similarity in letters or their order cannot by itself establish a semantic link. True, in some roots the shifting of letters alters meaning, but each case needs its own investigation. Hence, in the case of shukr and shirk, no decisive claim should rest on surface resemblance.
In the Qurʾān shukr is often contrasted with kufr: “If you are ungrateful, Allah is Independent of you … but if you are grateful He is pleased with it for you” (al-Zumar 39:7). The pairing of shukr and kufr clarifies that acknowledging Allah’s favours, appreciating His bounty and acting accordingly define shukr, whereas denial and ingratitude belong to kufr.
Early Arabic poetry and usage show similar pairings, useful for understanding shukr yet not evidence for any etymological tie between shukr and shirk. Establishing such a bond would need a separate linguistic inquiry.
One may observe conceptually that shukr involves recognising Allah’s blessing, whereas shirk involves associating another with Allah in His exclusive rights. This conceptual contrast is interesting but does not suffice to prove an etymological relation. Prudence therefore dictates treating the verbal resemblance as a starting point for research, not as conclusive evidence of semantic kinship; the ancient lexicons, root studies, poetry, Qurʾānic uses and statements of the philologists must all be examined.
4. The concept of shirk and modern human actions: genetic modification, food adulteration and human governance
A vital question is whether shirk is confined to its well-known doctrinal sense or may extend to other deviations in human activity. To answer, we must hold fast to the basic meaning of shirk and distinguish it from other moral and legal concepts.
Shirk, doctrinally, is to associate another with Allah in His ulūhiyya, rubūbiyya or His exclusive rights and authorities. The Qurʾān grounds human life in tawḥīd and makes plain that worship, servitude and absolute sovereignty belong to Allah alone. From this principle follows the inquiry whether a human being may grant another an independent, absolute right to legislate ḥalāl and ḥarām—a prerogative truly belonging to Allah.
Yet not every action that contradicts a divine command, is ḥarām, involves ẓulm or fasād, is thereby shirk. These matters may intersect, but each has its separate definition and ruling. Hence, before labelling any act as shirk one must ascertain whether it truly associates another with Allah in His exclusive rights.
a. The authority to declare lawful and unlawful
If one confers upon another, in defiance of Allah, an independent absolute right of legislation, making that person the ultimate arbiter of ḥalāl and ḥarām, such a notion conflicts with tawḥīd. But a rule, regulation or decision that happens to contradict the divine command is not automatically shirk. One must consider the underlying belief, intention, conception of authority, the relevant divine ruling and circumstances.
Administration, law and collective decisions are necessities of society. Some matters fall under Sharīʿa-stipulated principles; others lie within human ijtihād and maslaha. Such decisions are not, as such, participation in Allah’s right of legislation unless they truly contain that doctrinal deviation.
b. Genetic modification of food crops
Genetic modification is a major field of contemporary science. Its Sharīʿa ruling cannot rest only on the fact that human beings alter an organism’s genes. The real questions concern purpose, consequences, impact on health and environment, and whether any Sharīʿa prohibition, harm or deception is involved.
If modification aims at raising yield, disease resistance or nutritional sufficiency, and no established prohibition or proven harm exists, the act is not, by that fact alone, shirk or ḥarām. If, however, the method harms health, gravely threatens the environment or deceives consumers, its ruling will be determined accordingly.
Again, a harmful or unethical scientific process is not ipso facto shirk. Only if it entails denying Allah’s exclusive rights or ascribing independent creative power to another does the question of shirk arise.
c. Lethal adulteration of foodstuffs
Adulteration of food with dangerous substances, knowingly, constitutes serious ẓulm, khiyāna, deception and an endangerment of life. Islamic teaching enshrines the sanctity of life, honesty and avoidance of harm; hence such adulteration is emphatically condemned and must be prevented.
Yet, despite its gravity, adulteration should not, without further grounds, be labelled shirk. Only when it is coupled with granting another independent legislative authority or associating another in Allah’s exclusive rights does the aspect of shirk emerge. Otherwise, its prohibition, injustice and corruption stand under their own Sharīʿa headings.